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We show that the maximum transmission distance of continuous-variable quantum key distribution
in presence of a Gaussian noisy lossy channel can be arbitrarily increased using a linear noiseless
amplifier. We explicitly consider a protocol using amplitude and phase modulated coherent states
with reverse reconciliation. We find that a noiseless amplifier with amplitude gain g can increase
the maximum admissible losses by a factor g−2.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is certainly one of the most advanced
applications of quantum technologies. Within this field,
the most studied primitive is quantum key distribution
(QKD), which is the art of distributing a secret key to two
distant parties, Alice and Bob, in an untrusted environ-
ment controlled by an adversary, Eve [1]. The security of
QKD lies on the idea that an adversary trying to acquire
some information about the secret key will necessarily
introduce some noise in the quantum communication be-
tween Alice and Bob. A consequence of this idea is that if
the quantum channel is too lossy or noisy, then it cannot
be used to distill a secret key. This limits the maximum
transmission distance between the legitimate parties. De-
veloping QKD protocols resistant to losses and noise is
therefore of great practical importance.
Among QKD protocols, those encoding information in
the amplitude and phase of coherent states [2] have the
advantage of only requiring off-the-shelf telecom com-
ponents, as well as being compatible with wavelength-
division multiplexing [3], making an interesting solution
for robust implementations [4, 5].
On the theoretical side, these continuous-variable (CV)
protocols have been proven secure against arbitrary at-
tacks provided that they are secure against collective at-
tacks [6]. This latter condition is in particular met for
all CV protocols without postselection for which Gaus-
sian attacks are known to be optimal within collective
attacks [7–10].
Protocols with postselection on the other hand [11, 12],
where Alice and Bob only use part of their data to ex-
tract a secret key, can increase the robustness of QKD
to losses and noise but at the price of more involved
security proofs. In particular, their security is only es-
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tablished against Gaussian attacks [13, 14], or when an
active symmetrization of the classical data is applied [15].
In this paper, we consider the use of a noiseless linear
amplifier (NLA) [16–21] on the detection stage as a way
to increase the robustness of CV QKD protocols against
losses and noise. First, it should be noted that while am-
plifiers can effectively recover classical signals, they only
offer limited advantages when working on quantum sig-
nals, as amplification is bound to preserve the original
signal to noise ratio (SNR) [18, 22, 23]. This implies that
ordinary linear amplifiers, as those realized by optical
parametric processes [24], can only find limited applica-
tions in the context of QKD [25].
On the other hand, a probabilistic NLA can in principle
amplify the amplitude of a coherent state while retaining
the initial level of noise [16]. Thus, when only consid-
ering its successful runs, the NLA can compensate the
effect of losses and could therefore be useful for quantum
communication [26], and to establish the nonlocal nature
of quantum correlations thanks to a loophole-free Bell
test [27]. The availability of such a device has stimulated
intense experimental activity over the past years, demon-
strating the implementation of approximated versions
[17–21], which have provided solid proof-of-principle.
The question arises if these more sophisticated devices
can deliver a compensation of losses with a success rate
such that it may represent a useful tool for quantum cryp-
tography. Here we address this problem, by investigating
the advantages and limitations of the most general NLA
device, without making assumptions on the particular re-
alization.
We find a regime in which the NLA leads to an im-
provement of the maximum transmission distance attain-
able on a noisy and lossy Gaussian channel. Because of
the non-deterministic nature of the NLA, the security
proofs considered here are similar to those concerning
protocols with postselection, that is, they hold against
Gaussian attacks, or collective attacks provided an addi-
tional symmetrization of the classical data is performed.
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2II. DESCRIPTION OF THE GG02 PROTOCOL
We consider explicitly the case for the most com-
mon protocol for continuous-variable QKD, designed by
Grosshans and Grangier (GG02) [2]. In its prepare-and-
measure (PM) version, Alice encodes information in the
quadratures of coherent states which are then sent to Bob
through the untrusted quantum channel. Alice chooses
her preparation |α=xA+ipA〉 from a Gaussian distribu-
tion for the two quadratures having zero mean and vari-
ance VA. Bob randomly decides whether to measure the
xˆ or the pˆ quadrature, using homodyne detection. Alice
and Bob finally extract a secret key from the correlated
data by performing classical data manipulation and au-
thenticated classical communication. This protocol of-
fers a simple experimental implementation [28–31] and
is secure against finite-size collective attacks [32] as well
as arbitrary attacks in the asymptotic limit of arbitrary
long keys [6].
This protocol can be reformulated in an entanglement-
based version (EB), in terms of entanglement distri-
bution between Alice and Bob [33]: the two par-
ties initially share a two-mode squeezed vacuum state
|λ〉=√1− λ2∑∞n=0 λn|n〉|n〉, with λ<1. Alice performs
an heterodyne measurement on her mode, which projects
the other mode on a coherent state. The outcome of
Alice’s measurement is random, but with a probability
distribution depending on λ.
Although the EB version does not correspond to the
actual implementation, it is fully equivalent to the PM
version from a security point of view, and it provides a
more powerful description for establishing security proofs
against collective attacks through the covariance matrix
γAB of the state shared by Alice and Bob before their re-
spective measurements. In the case of a Gaussian channel
with transmittance T , and input equivalent excess noise
 [5]:
γAB =
(
V (λ)I
√
T (V (λ)2 − 1)Z√
T (V (λ)2 − 1)Z T (V (λ) +B + )I
)
(1)
where I= diag(1, 1) and Z= diag(1,−1), V (λ)= 1+λ21−λ2 is
the variance of the thermal state TrA |λ〉〈λ| related to
the modulation variance by VA=V−1, and B= 1−TT is the
input equivalent noise due to losses.
This matrix contains all the information needed to es-
tablish the secret key rate for collective attacks [29]:
∆I(λ, T, , β)=βIAB(λ, T, )− χBE(λ, T, ), (2)
where IAB=
1
2 log2(
V+B+
1+B+ ) is the mutual information
shared by Alice and Bob given by Shannon’s theory [34],
and χBE is the Holevo bound for the mutual information
shared by Eve and Bob (see Appendix B). The reconcil-
iation efficiency β<1 accounts for the fact that in prac-
tical implementations of this protocol, Alice and Bob do
not have sufficient resources to reach the Shannon limit.
Steady progress has been made in recent years on the
problem of error correction for CV QKD [35–37] and to-
day procedures based on modern error correcting tech-
niques achieve β ≈ 95% for a large range of SNR [38].
III. EQUIVALENT CHANNEL AND
SQUEEZING
Let us now consider the use of a NLA in the GG02
protocol. As usual, we will perform the security analysis
of the EB version. Here, we restrict ourselves to the case
of a Gaussian quantum channel, that is Eve is limited to
performing Gaussian attacks. Since the secure key rate
of the protocol depends only on the covariance matrix
of Alice and Bob γAB, it is sufficient to compute it in
presence of the NLA.
In this modified version of the protocol, Alice and Bob
implement GG02 as usual but Bob adds a NLA to his
detection stage, before his homodyne detection, which
is here assumed to be perfect. Then, only the events
corresponding to a successful amplification will be used
to extract a secret key. This scheme is therefore very
similar to protocols with postselection.
Since the output of the NLA remains in the Gaus-
sian regime, we can look for equivalent parameters of an
EPR state sent through a Gaussian noisy channel. Their
derivation is explained in detail in Appendix A, where
it is shown that the covariance matrix γAB(λ, T, , g) of
the amplified state is equal to the covariance matrix
γAB(ζ, η, 
g, g=1) of an equivalent system with an EPR
parameter ζ, sent through a channel of transmittance η
and excess noise g, without using the NLA. Those effec-
tive parameters are given by:
ζ = λ
√
(g2 − 1) (− 2)T − 2
(g2 − 1) T − 2 ,
η =
g2T
(g2 − 1)T ( 14 (g2 − 1) (− 2) T − + 1)+ 1 ,
g = − 1
2
(
g2 − 1) (− 2) T.
(3)
This identification easily provides the secret informa-
tion ∆Ig corresponding to the successful amplification,
since Eq. 2 can be used with the effective parameters:
∆Ig(λ, T, , β) = ∆I(ζ, η, g, β). (4)
Those parameters can be interpreted as physical pa-
rameters of an equivalent system if they satisfy the physi-
cal meaning constraints 0≤ζ<1, 0≤η≤1, and g≥0. Since
λ is a global factor in the expression of ζ, the first con-
dition is always satisfied if λ is below a limit value:
0 ≤ ζ < 1⇒ 0 < λ <
(√
(g2−1) (−2)T−2
(g2−1) T − 2
)−1
. (5)
As η and g do not depend on λ, the parameter ζ can
be considered as independent of those two parameters,
keeping in mind that this simply sets the value of λ.
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Figure 1. Equivalent channel and squeezing: a state |λ〉 sent
through a Gaussian channel of transmittance T and excess
noise , followed by a successful amplification, has the same
Alice-Bob covariance matrix than a state |ζ〉 sent through
a Gaussian channel of transmittance η and excess noise g,
without the NLA.
The second and the third conditions are satisfied if the
excess noise is smaller than 2, and if the gain is smaller
than a maximum value given by Eq. A19, and plotted
on Fig. 2.
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Figure 2. gmax(T, ) against the losses in dB. =0.2.
IV. INCREASE OF THE MAXIMUM
TRANSMISSION DISTANCE
The analysis of the equivalent state allows us to com-
pare the secret key rate obtained with and without an
ideal NLA. The comparison must be performed for a
given channel with fixed losses T and excess noise , as
those parameters cannot be controlled by Alice or Bob.
However, since the relevant quantity is the maximum se-
cret key rate achievable over this channel, Alice is allowed
to optimize her modulation variance VA (or equivalently,
the parameter λ) in order to maximize the secret key
rate.
The secret key rate without the NLA is given by
∆I(λ, T, , β) (Eq. 2). The secret key rate with the NLA
∆INLA is obtained by multiplying the secret key rate for
successful amplifications ∆Ig by the probability of suc-
cess Psuc. If the NLA has a sufficient dynamics to neglect
distortions, we can assume that Psuc is constant. This is
a reasonable assumption if β<1, since in that case the
optimal value of VA is not infinite. The precise value of
Psuc will depend on practical implementations, and is not
important is our study, since it only acts as a scaling fac-
tor and does not change the fact that a negative secret
key rate can become positive with a NLA. Therefore,
∆INLA = Psuc∆I(ζ, η, 
g). (6)
In Appendix D, we show that the probability of suc-
cess for a NLA of gain g is upper bounded by 1/g2. We
can therefore use this bound, keeping in mind that the
relevant conclusion which can be taken is only whether
the secret key rate is positive or not. Both secret key
rate with and without the NLA are computed using the
formulae given in Appendix B.
Since the expression of ∆I is relatively difficult to ma-
nipulate, we perform a series expansion at the first order
in T , which corresponds to the strong losses regime (Ap-
pendix C). The approximate secret key rate is given by
Eq. C1. Its expression gives us an intuition about two
important behaviors: first, since T appears inside the
expansion and not only as a global factor, it explains
why there can be a maximum transmission distance, or
equivalently a value Tlim for which the secret key rate
becomes null. Second, in this regime, the effect of the
NLA is simply to replace the transmittance T by g2T ,
the other physical parameters being the same. Hence, it
is clear that the losses are reduced, which will increase
the maximum distance of transmission.
Let us prove those statements more precisely. From
Eq. C1, we find an analytical value of Tlim when g=1
(i.e without the NLA),
Tlim =
1

2λ
− 4λ4
(λ2−1)2 e
λ2(2β+)−
(λ2−1) . (7)
This expression clearly tends to 0 when  tends to 0,
which shows that there is no maximum transmission dis-
tance without excess noise. Interestingly, there is a max-
imum transmission distance as soon as the excess noise 
is non zero, even if the reconciliation efficiency β equals
1. When β decreases or when  increases, this maximum
transmission distance decreases. There is no limitation
of the distance of transmission only when =0, and in
that case Eq. C1 takes a simple form:
∆INLA' 1
g2
g2Tλ2
(
1−λ2) (β−2 log λ)+2 log λ
(λ2−1)2 log(2) '∆I. (8)
This shows that for strong losses without excess noise, the
secret key rate using the NLA with the most optimistic
probability of success is the same as the secret key rate
without the NLA, and is always positive if λ is optimized.
Tlim can also be optimized (i.e. minimized) by optimizing
λ. Interestingly, the optimal value λopt depends only on
β, as shown by Eq. C2.
The same calculation with a NLA of gain g shows that:
T glim =
1
g2
Tlim. (9)
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Figure 3. Maximized secret key rate against losses in dB. The
maximization is performed on λ for the series expansion, and
on ζ for the the numerical expression. The numerical curves
are in excellent agreement with the analytical expansions. As
explained in the main text, the secret key rate with the NLA
is very optimistic due to the probability of success 1/g2, and
hence its curve gives only information on its positivity. The
other parameters are =0.05, β=0.95 [38].
Therefore, the losses for which the secret key rate is zero
are increased by:
∆L = 20 log10 g dB. (10)
Let us stress that this result does not depend on the
probability of success of the NLA, which simply acts as
a scaling factor for the secret key rate. Hence, even for a
more realistic probability of success, the NLA increases
the maximum distance of transmission in the same way.
Those results are compared with numerical results for
the full expressions of ∆I and ∆INLA, on Fig. 3 and 4.
For both figures, the secret key rate is computed without
the NLA and with a NLA of gain g=4 (which is in the
allowed region of Fig. 2).
Those figures clearly show that the secret key rate stays
positive for losses increased by ∆L=12 dB. Fig. 4 also
shows that for given losses, the secret key rate stays pos-
itive for a higher value of excess noise. However, the gain
in excess noise depends on the losses, and does not have
a simple analytical expression.
Another important remark concerns the optimal gain.
If the transmission can be intuitively increased by in-
creasing the gain, this is not always the case for the se-
cret key rate, as shown on Fig. 5. The first reason is the
competition between the decreasing probability of suc-
cess 1/g2 and the potential increase of the secret key rate
for the successfully amplified states. The second reason is
due to the dependance on the gain of the effective param-
eters (Eq. 3): the higher the gain, the higher η, but also
the higher g. If the gain is too high, it is thus possible
that the effective excess noise g would be too important,
for the transmittance η, to give a positive ∆INLA.
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Figure 4. Maximal excess noise for which the secret key rate
is positive, against losses. The curves do not depend on the
probability of success chosen for the NLA. The maximization
is performed on λ for the series expansion, and on ζ for the nu-
merical expression. For low losses, we see that the first order
expansion is not enough, whereas it is in excellent agreement
with the numerical curve for strong losses. The reconciliation
efficiency is β=0.95 [38].
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Figure 5. Maximized secret key rate against the gain of
the NLA, with a probability of success 1/g2. β=1, =0.1,
losses=30 dB. With a gain g=1, the secret key rate is neg-
ative. The NLA can increase the secret key rate to positive
values when the gain is increased up to a certain value, how-
ever if the gain is too important the secret key rate decreases
and becomes negative again. The reason is that the effective
excess noise becomes too important for the effective transmit-
tance.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In presence of excess noise, the secret key rate of the
GG02 protocol against Gaussian collective attacks always
becomes negative for a certain distance of transmission.
We have shown that the noiseless linear amplifier can
increase this distance by the equivalent of 20 log10 g dB
of losses. We have also shown that for given losses, the
protocol is more robust against excess noise.
5Our calculation of the secret key rate with the amplifier
was based on an effective system for which the security
proofs are well established. This approach could also find
applications in other quantum communication protocols
involving an EPR state sent through a quantum channel,
followed by a noiseless amplifier. In particular, it could be
applied to other CV QKD protocols, for instance proto-
cols using squeezed states or with a heterodyne detection
[39–42]
A further work would be to consider the experimentally
demonstrated schemes of the NLA, which are only valid
approximations of the ideal NLA up to a certain number
of photons. If the state can be well approximated by
this truncation, so that the Gaussian approximation still
holds, the results presented in this paper are still valid.
On the other hand, if the Gaussian approximation does
not hold anymore, security proofs are more complicated
to manipulate. This problem lies beyond the scope of the
present work, and deserves further investigation.
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Appendix A: Derivation of the effective parameters
In this appendix, we detail the method used
to obtain the effective parameters of Section III.
Let us start by first computing the output of
the NLA when the input state ρˆ is a thermal
state ρˆth(λch)=(1−λ2ch)
∑∞
n=0 λ
2n
ch |n〉〈n| displaced by
β=βx+iβy:
ρˆ=Dˆ(β)ρˆth(λch)Dˆ(−β). (A1)
This would be the state received by Bob if he knew the
result of Alice’s heterodyne measurement. The state ρˆ
can be decomposed on an ensemble of coherent states
using the P function:
ρˆ =
∫
P (α)|α〉〈α|dα. (A2)
where P (α)= e
|α|2
pi2
∫
e|u|
2〈−u|ρˆ|u〉eu∗α−uα∗du. Straight-
forward calculations show that 〈−u−β|ρˆth(λch)|u−β〉 =
(1−λ2ch)e−|u|
2(1+λ2ch)−|β|2(1−λ2ch)+(uβ∗−u∗β)(1−λ2ch), and
therefore P (αx+iαy)=p(αx)p(αy), with
p(αx) =
1√
pi
√
1− λ2ch
λ2ch
e
− 1−λ
2
ch
λ2
ch
(αx−βx)2
. (A3)
In the absence of thermal noise (λch=0), the expres-
sion (A3) becomes proportional to a Dirac distribution
δ(αx−βx). The same statements hold for p(αy).
The successful amplification can ideally be described
by an operator Cˆ=gnˆ, where nˆ is the number operator
in the Fock basis. The final state has to be normalized,
but one has to be careful that the norm is not the success
probability of the transformation, since Cˆ is unbounded.
The amplification of a coherent state |α〉 leads to an am-
plified coherent state proportional to |gα〉:
Cˆ|α〉=e |α|
2
2 (g
2−1)|gα〉. (A4)
Since Cˆ is linear, the amplification of ρˆ is simple to de-
rive, using (A3) and (A4) in the decomposition (A2):
ρˆ′ = CˆρˆCˆ (A5)
=
∫
P (α)e|α|
2(g2−1)|gα〉〈gα|dα. (A6)
By introducing the change of variable u=gα, one gets
ρˆ′ =
∫
P (u/g)e
g2−1
g2
|u2||u〉〈u|du. (A7)
As before, it is easy to see that P (u/g)=p(ux/g)p(uy/g).
Since |u2|=u2x+u2y, we can consider only the term
p(ux/g) exp
(
g2−1
g2 u
2
x
)
, the results being similar for uy:
p(ux/g)e
g2−1
g2
u2x=
1√
pi
√
1−λ2ch
λ2ch
e
− 1−λ
2
ch
λ2
ch
(uxg −βx)2+ g
2−1
g2
u2x
.
(A8)
The argument of the exponential can easily put in the
form:
−1−λ
2
ch
λ2ch
(u
g
−βx
)2
+
g2−1
g2
u2 =
−1−g
2λ2ch
g2λ2ch︸ ︷︷ ︸
Thermal state gλch
(
u− βx g 1−λ
2
ch
1−g2λ2ch︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effective gain
)2
−β2x
(1−g2)(1−λ2ch)
1−g2λ2ch︸ ︷︷ ︸
Normalization term
.
(A9)
Thus, the expression (A9) clearly corresponds to a ther-
mal state ρˆth(gλch) displaced by g
1−λ2ch
1−g2λ2ch
β, up to a
global unimportant normalization factor independent of
the variable integrated α or u. We can conclude that:
ρˆ′ ∝ Dˆ(g˜β)ρˆth(gλch)Dˆ(−g˜β). (A10)
where g˜ = g
1−λ2ch
1−g2λ2ch
. In order to keep a physical inter-
pretation, we note that g must be such that gλch<1.
Let us now find the values of β and λch correspond-
ing to the Entanglement-Based protocol presented in the
main text. When Alice obtains the results αA for her
heterodyne measurement on one mode of the EPR state
|λ〉, the second mode is projected on a coherent state
with an amplitude proportional to λαA [33]. This state
is then sent through the quantum channel of transmit-
tance T , with transforms its amplitude to ∝ √TλαA.
The displacement β can thus be taken as:
β =
√
TλαA. (A11)
The variance
1+λ2ch
1−λ2ch
of the thermal state corresponds to
Bob’s variance 1+T when VA=0:
1 + λ2ch
1− λ2ch
= 1 + T⇒ λ2ch =
T
2 + T
. (A12)
Finally, the action of the NLA (Eq. A10) on a displaced
thermal state given by Eq. A11 and A12 induces the
transformations:
√
TλαA →
NLA
g
1− λ2ch
1− g2λ2ch
√
TλαA,
T 
2 + T
→
NLA
g2
T
2 + T
.
(A13)
The next step is to consider the action of the NLA when
Bob does not have any knowledge on Alice’s measurement
7outcome. In such a case, his state is a thermal state
ρˆB=(1−λ?2)
∑∞
n=0(λ
?)2n|n〉〈n|, whose variance is given
by γAB:
1+λ?2
1−λ?2 = 1+TVA+T⇒λ
?2=
T
(
λ2 (2−) +)
2−λ2 (2+T (−2)) +T .
(A14)
Since the NLA always transforms a thermal state of pa-
rameter λ? into another thermal state of parameter gλ?,
Eq. A14 shows that the NLA performs the transforma-
tion:
T
(
λ2 (2−) +)
2−λ2 (2+T (−2)) +T →NLA g
2 T
(
λ2 (2−) +)
2−λ2 (2+T (−2)) +T .
(A15)
We have now all the required equations to find the
expression of the effective parameters ζ, η and g. Using
Eq. A13 and A15, those parameters must satisfy:
√
ηζ=g
1−λ2ch
1−g2λ2ch
√
Tλ,
ηg
2+ηg
=g2
T
2+T
,
η
(
ζ2 (2−g) +g)
2−ζ2 (2 + η (g−2)) +ηg=g
2 T
(
λ2 (2−) +)
2−λ2 (2+T (−2)) +T .
(A16)
This system can be solved, leading to:
ζ = λ
√
(g2 − 1) (− 2)T − 2
(g2 − 1) T − 2 ,
η =
g2T
(g2 − 1)T ( 14 (g2 − 1) (− 2) T − + 1)+ 1 ,
g = − 1
2
(
g2 − 1) (− 2) T.
(A17)
Finally, the expression of the maximum gain gmax(T, )
for which those parameters take physical values is given
by:
gmax(T, ) = (A18)√√√√ (T (−4) +2) +4√T (−2)+2 −2√ (T (−2) +2)+4T−4
T (−2) 2 .
(A19)
Let us stress some important comments about those ef-
fective parameters, which confirm the validity of their
expression. First, they naturally reduce to the real phys-
ical parameters without the NLA, for g=1:
g = 1⇒
 ζ = λη = Tg =  (A20)
Then, when there is no excess noise (=0), they match
previous results [16]:
 = 0⇒

ζ = λ
√
1 + (g2 − 1)T
η = g
2T
1+(g2−1)T
g = 0
(A21)
Appendix B: Expressions used to compute the Holevo bound χBE
The Holevo bound χBE is given by [29]: χBE = G
[
µ1−1
2
]
+G
[
µ2−1
2
]−G [µ3−12 ]−G [µ4−12 ] where
G[x] = (x+ 1) log2[x+ 1]− x log2[x] si x 6=0, et G[0] = 0 (B1)
µ21,2 =
1
2
(
A±
√
A2 − 4E
)
µ23,4 =
1
2
(
C ±
√
C2 − 4D
)
(B2)
A = V 2(1− 2T ) + 2T + T 2(V + χline)2 E = T 2(V χline + 1)2 (B3)
C =
V
√
E + T (V + χline)
T (V + χline)
D =
√
EV
T (V + χline)
(B4)
(B5)
V=VA+1 is the variance of Alice’s thermal state (see text for details), and χline =
1−T
T +  is the total equivalent
input noise. Bob’s homodyne detection is assumed to be perfect.
8Appendix C: First order expansion in T
The first order expansion in T of the secret key rate given in Appendix B using the NLA is:
∆INLA'
Psucg
2T
(−2βλ2(−1+λ2)− (−1+λ2)2(1+ log[2])+(−1+λ2)((−1+λ2)(log[]+ log[g2T ])+4λ2 log[λ])+2λ2 log[λ2])
(2(−1+λ2)2 log[2] .
(C1)
The equation that must satisfy the optimal value λopt to maximize the transmission distance (Eq. 7), and maximize
the secret key rate (Eq. C1), is given by :
λ2opt
(
λ2opt − 4 log(λopt)− 1
)
1− λ2opt
= β. (C2)
Fig. 6 shows λopt as a function of β:
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Figure 6. λopt against β. β=0.95 gives λopt'0.806.
Appendix D: Success probability
The success probability of the NLA can depend on
many experimental factors. Here, we are interested in
deriving an upper bound based on very general princi-
ples, when the success probability can be considered as
being a constant value. In this way, we can obtain an
optimistic estimate of its performance, but certainly we
will not overlook interesting regimes. In both EB and PM
versions of the GG02 protocol, Bob’s state prior to any
classical communication with Alice is the thermal state
ρˆB(λ
?)=(1−λ?2)∑∞n=0(λ?)2n|n〉〈n|.
Consider now that the NLA produces an amplified
state ρˆB(gλ
?) with a success probability Psuc. When the
amplification fails, the protocol is aborted, and the state
is simply replaced by the vacuum |0〉〈0|. Without post-
selection, the NLA can therefore be represented as a trace
preserving operation T described by:
T (ρˆB(λ?)) = PsucρˆB(gλ?) + (1− Psuc)|0〉〈0|. (D1)
Naturally, T applied on the vacuum also gives the vac-
uum, regardless of the value of Psuc. Since any trace pre-
serving quantum operation cannot decrease the fidelity
F between two quantum states [43], T must verify:
F
(
ρˆB(λ
?), |0〉〈0|
)
≤ F
(
T (ρˆB(gλ?), |0〉〈0|
)
. (D2)
which gives us an upper bound on Psuc. Indeed, inserting
the expression for Bob’s transformed state (Eq. D1) in
the constraints on fidelities (Eq. D2), we find that Psuc
must verify:
〈0|ρˆB(λ?)|0〉 ≤ 〈0|
(
PsucρˆB(gλ
?)+(1−Psuc)|0〉〈0|
)
|0〉.
(D3)
which is satisfied if:
Psuc ≤ 1
g2
. (D4)
